CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SUSPENSION OF
DEPORTATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS

It has long been argued that an alleged conflict exists between
the doctrine of separation of powers and the congressional veto.
This Comment analyzes Chadha v. INS, a Ninth Circuit decision
which constitutes the most recent attempt by the judiciary to resolve this long-standingissue. Chadha involves a challenge to the
constitutionality of the congressionalreview of suspension of deportationas being a violation of separationof powers. The Comment suggests that the time has come for Congress to release its
hold on the suspension process. This conclusion is based on an
analysis of both practicaland constitutionalfactors. The United
States Supreme Court's recent granting of certiorariin Chadha
indicates the possibility of a final resolution of this issue.

INTRODUCTION

In 1940 Congress delegated the power to suspend deportation to
the Attorney General.' Since that time, immigration officials have
faced the "impossible task of measuring without scientific instruments the possible pain and suffering aliens would endure if required to depart our shores." 2 Under very limited circumstances,
certain undocumented aliens can avoid deportation,3 but the alien

must endure prolonged administrative procedures to obtain suspension. 4 Upon successfully completing the administrative process, the alien has one final hurdle: the express or implied
approval of Congress must be obtained to finalize suspension of
1. The Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 672 (1940) (amending the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19(c), 39 Stat. 874 (1917)).
2. Wasserman, Grounds & ProceduresRelating to Deportation,13 SAN DrGO
L. REv. 125, 137 (1975).
3. See notes 11-30 and accompanying text infra.
4. See 2 C. GORDON & I. ROSENFmLD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 7.9(f), at 7-170 (rev. ed. 1981).
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deportation.5
The final, and at times most critical, step for the alien is avoiding a "congressional veto" of the Attorney General's grant of suspension.6 In delegating to the Attorney General the power to
suspend deportation, Congress retained the right to override any
positive grant of relief.7 The basis for this congressional power is
derived from Article I of the Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power... to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, . .. [and] To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization ...
[and] to make all laws which shall be
8 necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing Powers.

The constitutionality of the congressional veto has long been
questioned. 9 This Comment will attempt to analyze both the theoretical and practical considerations behind this controversial issue. A recent Ninth Circuit decision, Chadha v. INS,1o has
attempted to resolve this long standing question.
SECTION

244(c) AND THE PROCESS OF SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION

Section 244(a) (2) of the McCarran-Walter Act" allows suspension of deportation in situations where an alien has committed serious violations of the laws of the United States.' 2 The legislative
history of section 244 indicates a congressional intent to "ameliorate the hardship caused by deportation."' 3 To be eligible for suspension of deportation, an alien must meet three general
5. The Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1976)
[hereinafter cited as L & N. Act].
6. Id. Obtaining relief prior to congressional review is in itself no easy task.
One commentator has stated that: "[o]btaining relief has been extremely difficult
for the alien because courts have narrowly construed the statutory language ....
However, a strict construction is incompatible with the ameliorative purpose of
the suspension of deportation provision." Comment, Suspension of Deportation:
Illusory Relief, 14 SAN DIEGO L. Ruv. 229, 234 (1976).
7. L & N. Act § 244(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1976); Kwai Chiu Yuen v. INS, 406
F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1969).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
9. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980). See note 38 and accompanying
text infra.
10. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Chadha determined that the congressional veto of
suspension of deportation decisions was unconstitutional, violating the doctrine of
separation of powers.
11. In 1952, Congress adopted the McCarran-Walter Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1557 (1976)). Section 244 of that Act governs the
process of suspension of deportation. Section 244(a) (1) provides for suspension in
cases where an alien has committed "minor" violations of the laws of the United
States. L & N. Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
12. Crimes involving moral turpitude, e.g., anarchy and prostitution. See L &
N. Act § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a), for a complete list under paragraphs (4), (5),
(6), (7), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16), (17), and (18).
13. For a summary of the legislative history of this provision, see Comment,
supra note 6, at 233 n.35.
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requirements: physical presence within the United States for a
specified number of years; proof of good moral character; and a
showing of extreme hardship if deported.14 Satisfaction of these
requirements only entitles the alien to "apply" for suspension;
the granting of relief is discretionary.
Suspension of deportation involves a long and tedious pro-

cess. 15 An application for suspension must be made before an im-

migration judge at the initial deportation hearing.16 The burden is
on the applicant to show that he has met eligibility requirements.' 7 The immigration judge must make two separate determinations. First, the judge must determine, as a question of law,
whether the statutory prerequisites have been met. 8 Next, the
judge must exercise discretion in determining whether to grant
suspension.19 Congress granted the Attorney General broad discretion in allowing the immigration judge to consider the equities
presented. 20
If the immigration judge decides against suspension, the alien
may appeal within ten days to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 2 1 If the appeal for suspension is denied, the alien may seek
other remedies, including judicial review.22 If suspension is
granted, either by the immigration judge or on appeal, one final
14. I. & N. Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
15. See generally 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMI=GRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9(f), at 7-170 to -177 (rev. ed. 1981).
16. Id. § 7.9(f) (1), at 7-170. See 8 C.F.R. 242.17(a), (d) (1980); Foti v. INS, 375
U.S. 217, 222 (1963); Yick Chin v. INS, 386 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1967).
17. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(d) (1980); Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960). Upon
meeting the burden, the alien's case then proceeds on the merits. McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1960).
18. 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, ImIIIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9
(rev. ed. 1981).
19. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77 (1956); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S.
345, 354 (1956); Roberts, The Exercise ofAdministrative Discretion under the ImmigrationLaws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144 (1975).
20. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 361 (1956) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Comment,
Discretionunder the ImmigrationLaws: May the Attorney GeneralAdopt Rules or
Must He Follow the "Crooked Code" of the Ad Hoc Proceedings?,1972 UTAH L. REV.
294.
21. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1981); 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMGRATION LAW
AN PROCEDURE § 7.9(f) (2), at 7-172 (rev. ed. 1981).
22. The alien has three options: (1) seek reversal from the Attorney General,
(2) attempt to have a private immigration bill passed by Congress, or (3) appeal to
the circuit court in his jurisdiction. The Attorney General's unfavorable action is
subject to judicial review even though Congress has the final word in granting suspension of deportation. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950); Wong Wing
Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966). See Comment, How to Immigrate to the

step must occur-congressional approval. 23 The constitutionality
and practicality of this final step has been both criticized and defended over the years.
Section 244(c) outlines two different procedures for obtaining
congressional approval. 24 If suspension is granted for common
grounds of deportation, it is final unless either house of Congress
acts by resolution to veto the decision.25 If suspension is granted
despite more aggravated grounds for deportation the affirmative
approval of both houses of Congress by concurrent resolution is
required.26 Section 244(c) (1) orders that upon suspension "a
complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to Congress with the
reasons for such suspension." 27 In practice, grants of suspension
are referred to the Judiciary Committee of the respective house
United States: A PracticalGuide for the Attorney, 14 SAN DIEGO L REV. 193, 232

(1976).
23. L & N. Act § 244(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1976).
24. Id. Section 244(c) provides as follows:
(1) Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General
to meet the requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney
General may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the
deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons
for such suspension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first day of
each calendar month in which Congress is in session.
(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of
this sectionif during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or
prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the
session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the House of
Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does
not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General
shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary
departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the
manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither
the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.
(3) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of
this sectionif during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or
prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the
session at which a case is reported, the Congress passes a concurrent
resolution stating in substance that it favors the suspension of such
deportation, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings. If within the time above specified the Congress does not pass
such a concurrent resolution, or if either the Senate or the House of
Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does
not favor the suspension of the deportation of such alien, the Attorney
General shall thereupon deport such alien in the manner provided by
law.
25. Id. § 244(c) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2).
26. Id. § 244(c) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (3).
27. Id. § 244(c) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1).
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for review and recommendation. 28
The lack of meaningful review at the congressional level has led
one commentator to state that "the consideration by Congress of
the suspension is perfunctory and without debate, with Congressmen apparently content to rely on the recommendations of the judiciary committees, which in turn, rely upon the views of their
immigration subcommittees. '29 Such "circular" review needlessly
involves congressional committees in hundreds of deportation
30
cases which have already been extensively examined.
From a practical standpoint, congressional review of suspension
of deportation decisions adds nothing to the proceeding. After the
Attorney General has exercised his discretion to suspend deportation, it becomes superfluous to later superimpose the discretion
of a small group of Congressmen. Any abuse of discretion by the
Attorney General is already subject to judicial review. 31
In 1980 the House of Representatives passed a bill which would
have eliminated congressional review from the suspension process. 32 The bill, known as H.R. 7273, was part of the "Carter effi28.
§ 7.9(f)
29.
30.

2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
(4), at 7-174 (rev. ed. 1981).
Maslow, Recasting Our DeportationLaw, 56 COLUM. L REV. 309, 345 (1956).
2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE

§ 7.9(f) (4), at 7-174 (rev. ed. 1981).
31. In 1953, the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization described the process of congressional review of suspension of deportation:
In immigration matters, in particular, it frustrates proper administration
and puts a premium on extraneous considerations in the determination of
legal rights. The exercise of discretion according to standards fixed by
Congress is peculiarly an executive function. The legislature is not
equipped and not intended to be equipped, to handle the details of
administration.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL
WELCOME

214 (1953).

32. H.R. REP. No. 7273, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1980) provides:
Section 9(a) of the bill eliminates the requirement of a report to Congress
on the grant of suspension of deportation by the Attorney General. Under
the current section 244 of the Act, in most cases where suspension is
granted by the Attorney General, Congress has the option of disapproving
that grant. In more serious cases, the Attorney General's grant of suspension of deportation requires an affirmative act of approval by the Congress. The Department of Justice has taken the position that the current
law's provision for a 'one-House veto' of executive action is unconstitutional. A case involving that issue is currently pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Chadha v. INS, Civ. No. 77-1702, 9th Cir. As a
practical matter, suspension of deportation can be granted only following
a hearing by an immigration judge, and the statutory criteria applied are
quite strict. The Department strongly recommends the deletion of the

ciency package" to eliminate procedures that served little
purpose in comparison to their cost in time and money. 33 Despite
favorable reports by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill
failed in the Senate by a small margin.3 4 The narrow defeat of
H.R. 7273 demonstrates that even Congress has grave doubts
about the value of its review of suspension decisions.
THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE
CONGRESSIONAL VETO

In Chadha v. INS,35 the Ninth Circuit found the one-house congressional veto 36 of suspension to be unconstitutional as a viola-

tion of the doctrine of separation of powers. Before analyzing the
Ninth Circuit's approach, a preliminary examination of the doctrine of separation of powers is required.
The status of the doctrine was best summarized by Professor
Kenneth Cuip Davis:
Both the words and the history of the Constitution leaves largely open the
question whether a theory of separation of powers is embodied in the
Constitution, and, if so, what that theory shall be. What the Supreme
Court has said and done about the theory has differed from time to time,
and at no time has it made the theory into a fixed or unalterable principle.
within limits, can fabricate its own theory of separation
Each generation,
37
of powers.

The number of commentators who have struggled with the doctrine and reached opposite theoretical conclusions demonstrates
provisions relating to congressional action on suspension of deportation

cases.
See also 58 INTERPRETER RELEASES 7 (1981).
33. H.R. REP. No. 7273, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). Compare also the dissenting view of Congressman Henry J. Hyde:
I believe that Sec. 9 of H.R. 7273 amending Sec. 244(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is ill-advised and detrimental to the plenary
power over immigration granted to the Congress....
In the 94th and 95th Congresses, the Congress reviewed a total of 508
cases and disapproved 11 cases submitted under Sec. 244(a) (1) and disapproved all 13 cases submitted under Sec. 244(a) (2).
The rationale for this amendment presumably is to relieve the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the task of submitting complete and detailed statements to Congress, as well as to relieve the Congress of having
to review each case and process legislation in accordance with the present
provision....
I cannot help but feel that the congressional action presently required
on these cases acts as a deterrent to the number of applications received
by the Attorney General for relief under this section of the law. Eliminating this requirement by giving the Attorney General complete discretion
in each of these cases could lead to diverse interpretations and possibly a
diminution of the standards applied in the past.
Id. at 96-97.
34. 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 589 (1980).
35. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
36. L & N. Act § 244(c) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) (1976).
37. 1 K.C. DAvis, ADiMNISTRATVE LAw TREATISE § 2:6, at 75 (2d ed. 1978).

[VOL. 19: 177, 19811

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the confusion in this area of constitutional law.38
Because the Constitution makes no mention of the doctrine of
separation of powers, 39 the Supreme Court's open-ended interpretations provide the only basis for discussion. The Supreme Court
examined the doctrine in the landmark decision of Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.40 In that case, Justice Jackson emphasized that although the Constitution delegated power to the
three branches, its purpose was to integrate the dispersed powers
into a workable government.4 1 Other decisions analyzing the doctrine of separation of powers have held that the doctrine is "in2
herent" in the first three articles of the Constitution.
In essence, the doctrine of separation of powers arose out of a
perceived need to prevent overreaching by any branch of government. As the Supreme Court stated in Buckley v. Valeo:43 "The
men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle

of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny."44 James
Madison summarized the framers' thoughts, writing that "When
38. J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1964); Abourezk,
The CongressionalVeto: A ContemporaryResponse to Executive Encroachment on
Legislative Prerogative, 52 IND. U.J. 323 (1977); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional
Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L
REV. 1369 (1977); Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467 (1952); Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of
Powers: The Executive on A Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978); Ginnane, The Control of FederalAdministration by CongressionalResolutions and Committees, 66
HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional
Limits, 16 HARv. J. LEG. 735 (1979); Javits & Klein, ConstitutionalOversight and the
Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L REV. 435 (1977); McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77 CoLmm. L REV. 1119
(1977); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional
Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1970); Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 46 GEO. WASH. L REV. 351 (1978); Note, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The ProbableResult of A ConstitutionalChallenge, 1976 DUKE L.J.285
(1976); Note, Constitutionalityof the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEG. 593 (1976).
See also Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of LawsShould LegislatorsSuperviseAdministrators,41 CALIF. U REV. 565 (1953); Watson,
Congress Steps Out A Look at CongressionalControl of the Executive, 63 CALIF.
L REV. 983 (1975).
39. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1067 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied 434
U.S. 1009 (1978).
40. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
41. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
42. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928); Myers v. U.S., 272 1.S. 52 (1926).
43. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
44. Id. at 121. The Court went on to state: "But they likewise saw that a her-

the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body, there can be no liberty."45 Regardless of the doctrine's origin, the Supreme Court has recognized it as an element
of constitutional law.4 6
No viable attempt has been made to resolve the alleged conflict
between the doctrine of separation of powers and the congressional veto. The Supreme Court has chosen not to interpret the
doctrine's effect on the legislative veto.47 The Supreme Court's silence is not due to lack of opportunity. The Court has managed to
avoid the issue by either denying certiorari or by deciding cases
on other grounds.4 8 A recent example is Buckley v. Valeo 4 9 where
several congressional veto provisions in the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 197450 were challenged on separation of powers grounds. The Supreme Court chose to find the provisions unconstitutional on other grounds,51 in effect sidestepping
the legislative veto question.
In his concurring opinion in Buckley, Justice White alone addressed the constitutionality of the congressional veto from a separation of powers standpoint.5 2 He concluded that the legislative
veto did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. 53 Justice
White's analysis was based on the assumption that "[failing to
veto a regulation] no more invaded the President's powers than
does a regulation not required to be laid before Congress." 54 As
Judge MacKinnon pointed out in Clark v. Valeo, 5 however, this
statement is merely a play on words and denies reality. Even in
those situations where no congressional veto occurs, Congress
has acted affirmatively to allow that result.56 Whether criticized

metic sealing off of the three branches of government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Id.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison) at 324-26 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

46. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,118-24 (1976).
47. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
48. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028
(Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
50. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
51. The Supreme Court found that Congress was unconstitutionally attempting to share the executive power of appointment. Congress had provided for congressional appointment of four out of six members of the commission. Id.
52. 424 U.S. at 245-85 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. "The provision for congressional disapproval of agency regulations does
not appear to transgress the constitutional design, at least where the President
has agreed to legislation establishing the disapproval procedure or the legislation
has been passed over his veto." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 286.
54. 424 U.S. at 245-85 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. 559 F.2d 642, 685-90 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
56. Id. Professor McGowan states:
Whether or not the congressional veto ultimately is deemed constitu-
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or supported, Justice White's concurrence has little precedential
value. The view of only one Supreme Court Justice is hardly indicative of how the entire Court will respond to the issue in the
future.
The last major federal court decision involving the constitutionality of the congressional veto was Atkins v. United States.57 In
Atkins, the Court of Claims sustained a one-house veto provision
contained in the Federal Salary Act of 1977.58 The Supreme Court
denied certiorari.5 9 Under the Salary Act the President recommended executive, legislative and judicial salaries which could be
vetoed by either house of Congress. 60 The Atkins court, in a four
to three decision, emphasized the competency of Congress to examine simple salary figures and determine their appropriateness. 6 ' The court noted that the President and Congress had

merely switched roles in the process of salary structure. 62
It is important to note that Atkins was decided on extremely
narrow grounds. The court stated that, "[w] e are not to consider,
and do not consider, the general question of whether a one-house
veto is valid as an abstract proposition, in all instances, across-

the-board, or even in most cases." 63 The court held that this par-

ticular one-house veto passed the test of "common sense and inherent necessities of the governmental coordination."6 4 The
language in Atkins is important because of its apparent conflict
with the recent Chadha decision.65 The Atkins court emphasized
that "[t]he President's salary proposals, even when they become
tional, its validity cannot be convincingly supported by the approach in

these quoted lines. The approach is not responsive to the way the congressional veto operates in practice, for it does not recognize that the influence over prospective regulations created in key members of Congress
by the mere existence of the veto provision may permeate the administrative process.
McGowan, supra note 38.
57. 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
58. Pub. L. No. 95-19, 91 Stat. 45 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 358-60 (West Supp.
1979)).

59. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
60. See note 58 supra.
61. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1059 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied 434
U.S. 1009 (1978).
62. Id. at 1065.
63. Id. at 1059.
64. Id.
65. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980). The loose language in Atkins
led Professor Dixon to write: "The opinion, however, is so loosely structured that
selective quotation from it could yield some support for an across-the-board vali-

law, do not order or regulate any person, either actually or potentially."66 This implies that there may be times when Congress
may not be competent to make the final decision due to its effect
on individual rights. An obvious example of this situation is suspension of deportation. After only brief review, Congress is allowed to deport an individual despite contrary administrative and
judicial findings.
Any conclusions drawn from an analysis of precedent are at
best speculative. Two commentators recently argued that:
Discussion of precedent eventually becomes a mere recitation of the traditional separation of powers themes of control and conflict. Since the relevant cases ... cite a history that is incomplete and an intent of the
framers that is in fact unascertainable, both critics and67supporters of the
congressional veto can find support for their argument.

It becomes apparent that by creatively interpreting precedent the
congressional veto can be found either constitutional in all cases
or, on the opposite extreme, unconstitutional in all cases.
Uncertainty in this area of the law may tempt future courts to
adopt one of the extreme positions. The wisdom of adopting either extreme must be closely scrutinized. Instead of relying on
abstract constitutional principles, the congressional veto must be
analyzed from a practical standpoint. The benefits of legislative
review should be balanced against the interference caused by
such review in each case. Any future analysis adopted by the
Supreme Court should avoid the temptation of a per se adoption
of either extreme.
An analysis of why Congress chooses to retain the power to
veto is essential for a rational understanding of the constitutional
issue. The framers did not realize the need for, nor did they foresee, the development of administrative agencies. 6 8 The tremendous growth of government over the years necessitated the
delegation of congressional power to independent agencies. Some
authors view this growing delegation to agencies as inevitable. 69
In addition, they view the legislative veto as a simple and logical
method of controlling "Congress' own creation." 70 Others argue
to the contrary that "the availability of the legislative veto encourdation of the congressional veto." Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation
of Powers: The Executive on A Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REv. 423, 474 (1978).
66. 556 F.2d 1028, 1059 (Ct. CL 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). The
court went on to state that: "[t]he recommendations do not affect the rights of
others, require them to do anything, impose any obligations on them, or restrict
any pre-existing rights or privileges of anyone other than those whose pay is
thereby established."
67. Miller &Knapp, supra note 38, at 384.
68. See Abourezk, supra note 38, at 329.
69. Henry, supra note 38, at 737.
70. Id.
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ages ill-considered legislation." 71 Congress may avoid making extensive public policy judgments in the early consideration of a
measure because the power to correct by veto is retained.7 2 Despite the conflict of opinion, provisions allowing for congressional
veto are increasing, apparently with the approval of the Supreme
Court.73
To what extent does congressional review serve a useful purpose? Many commentators believe the congressional veto as currently used unduly hampers agencies that were created by
Congress to perform delegated duties.7 4 Professor Dixon forcefully stressed that "[t]he difficulty with use of the congressional
device over the administration of the government is that it goes
beyond the oversight function per se and becomes an intermeddling activity with serious implications for responsible and orderly policy development." 75 In suspension of deportation cases,
congressional judicial committees make the actual determination
in recommendation form.76 In practice, Congress has been accused of intervening selectively and without any specific guidelines.7 7 It is unfortunate that a decision with potentially grave
consequences for an individual cannot practically be given the
courtesy of review by the entire Congress.
In contrast with the ineffectiveness of congressional review, the
administrative process clearly enhances the fairness of suspension proceedings. Federal regulations require certain procedural
safeguards.7 8 An alien is given the opportunity to present evidence during the hearing 7 9 The decision of the special inquiry of71. Id. at 761.
72. Id. "The legislative veto is, at best, an ad hoc and illusory remedy for institutional problems which Congress and the Courts have created since the New
Deal" Id.
73. Schwartz, supra note 38, at 357-59. Veto provisions "have been included in
federal legislation at least 183 times in 126 different acts of Congress in the last 43
years." H.R. REP. No. 1014, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976).
74. Miller & Knapp, supra note 38.
75. Dixon, supra note 38.
76. 2 C. GORDON & I. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 7.9(f) (4), at 7-174 (rev. ed. 1980).
77. Dixon, supra note 38.
78. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a), 242.8(a) (1980). "The hearing before the special inquiry officer, including the testimony, exhibits, applications and requests, the special inquiry officer's decision, and all written orders, motions, appeals, briefs, and
other papers filed in the proceedings shall constitute the record in the case." d.
§ 242.15.
79. Id. § 242.18. Formal enumeration of the findings is not required.

ficer must include a discussion of the evidence and findings.80 In
addition to the due process protections available to the alien at
the administrative level, the option of judicial review is always
present.81

It has been argued that the congressional veto is necessary to
control agencies to which Congress has no option but to delegate
broad powers. 82 The primary purpose of the congressional veto is
to increase the political accountability of agencies and attempt to
assure consistency with congressional intent.8 3 The legislative
veto may accomplish this even when not exercised. Its mere
presence may dissuade any administrative overreaching. 84 While
this argument is undoubtedly valid under certain circumstances,
it may be inapplicable in other situations. When Congress overturns the grant of suspension, the immigration judge is not informed of the reasons for reversal. It is difficult to believe that an
immigration judge, arriving at a decision without any congressional guidance, is restrained by the veto possibility.
The history of the doctrine of separation of powers has always
been one of accommodation.8 5 In 1930, Justice Frankfurter
warned that enforcement of a rigid conception of separation of
powers would make modern government impossible. 86 Overlap
between the branches may be necessary and advisable under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, in those situations where congressional vetoes go beyond general oversight and become
burdens on the administrative process, they should be struck
down. If Congress does not have the institutional capacity to provide more than a "perfunctory" review, it should release its hold
on the process. This stage has been reached in suspension of deportation procedure.
CHADHA

v. INS

In Chadha v. INS87 the Ninth Circuit invalidated section
244(c) (2),88 which allows one house of Congress to veto a grant of
suspension of deportation. The immigration judge at the lowerlevel hearing had exercised his discretion to suspend the deportation of Jagdish Chadha. The judge found that Chadha met the re80. 445 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1971).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See note 22 supra.
Abourezk, supra note 38.
Id.
Id.
Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 650 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

86. F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 78 (1930).

87. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
88. L & N. Act § 244(c) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) (1976).
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quirements of section 244(a) (1): he had resided in the United
States for over seven years, established good moral character, and
demonstrated extreme hardship if deported. 89 The House of Representatives acted to disapprove the suspension of Chadha's deportation.90 Chadha petitioned the Ninth Circuit,91 challenging
92
the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision.
The Chadha court set forth its interpretation of the doctrine of
separation of powers. The court found that the framers established the doctrine to serve a two-fold purpose: to prevent any
branch of government from assuming more than its share of
94
power,93 and to facilitate administration of a growing nation.
The court recognized that while perfect autonomy of the branches
is the ideal, it is not possible in a functioning government. The
end result is that courts are forced to interpret separation of pow95
ers questions pragmatically.
The Chadha court also established a two-pronged standard of
review to be applied in considering separation of powers issues.
First, the court outlined the parameters of a separation of powers
violation: one branch may not assume powers that are "central or
essential" to the operation of a coordinate branch. 9 6 Second, the
assumption of power must not disrupt the performance of duties
by a coordinate branch unless it is necessary to implement a legitimate governmental policy.97 If these two conditions are not
met, the action of the branch is unconstitutional.
The court then applied this standard of review to the legislative
veto of suspension of deportation. According to the Ninth Circuit,
the legislative veto could serve only three possible purposes: to
correct judicial or executive misapplication of the statute, to
jointly administer the statute on an ongoing basis, and to provide
a residual legislative power in defining substantive rights under
the law.98 The court held that any attempt by Congress to correct
misapplication of law would be an infringement on the adminis89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. § 244(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) (1976).
H.R. RES. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 40,800 (1975).
See I. & N. Act § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1976).
Id. § 244(c) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) (1976).
Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 422 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 429 (9th Cir. 1980).

trative and judicial process. 99 The court noted with concern that
the decision of Congress was not controlled by any procedural
constraints. Furthermore, there are no "provisions for review of
Congress' legal or factual conclusions." 0 0 The court could find no
reason why judicial review of the Attorney General's discretion
would not be adequate.lOl
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the idea of joint administration
of the suspension statute. The court stated that over time the Executive gained "skill and expertise" in administering the statute.
Congressional interference upsets the balance of consistent administration. 0 2 Congress is obviously not attempting to alter future conduct by the Executive. If this were the intent,
congressional vetoes of suspension would include an explanation
of where the Executive erred. This is rarely the case.
The assertion that Congress has a right to create substantive
immigration law was rejected by the Ninth Circuit on two
grounds. First, the court held that the right to make laws does not
include the right to overturn a long line of administrative decisions. 0 3 Second, the court did not find sufficient procedural compliance by the legislative review process. 0 4 The court, finding
these two points to be decisive, did not address the third point.
The Chadha court only mentions Atkins in passing,10 without
attempting to distinguish the decision. This is surprising as the
decisions are easily distinguished. The standard of review in
Chadha could have been applied to the facts in Atkins to arrive at
the identical result reached there by the Court of Claims. The difference would be in the balancing of equities. The Ninth Circuit
could also have emphasized the fact that Atkins was expressly
limited to its facts.1 0 6 Because both Atkins and Chadha emphasize practical considerations, the fact that opposite conclusions
99. Id. at 430. The court stated. "By reason of the congressional disapproval

device, nearly all judicial interpretations of the criteria in Section 244 are rendered, in effect, impermissible advisory opinions."
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 434.

104. Id. The court stated
The article I authorization to make law does not permit positive law which
alters the substantive legal rights of individuals to be enacted by a mere

executive recommendation, which is not a final exercise of specifically delegated power to alter these legal rights, followed by legislative inactionan inaction that could equally imply endorsement, acquiescence, passivity, indecision, or indifference.
105. Id. at 435 nA1.
106. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. CL 1977), cert denied 434 U.S.
1009 (1978).
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were reached is not entirely inconsistent.
Undoubtedly, the Ninth Circuit intentionally wrote a very broad
opinion. By limiting the decision in Chadha to its facts, the Ninth
Circuit could have avoided the possibility of Supreme Court reversal. By choosing to adopt a broad standard of review, the
Ninth Circuit filled an important gap in both immigration and constitutional law. The time had come to establish guidelines for reviewing the constitutionality of congressional vetoes on a broader
scale.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHADHA

It is well established that the doctrine of separation of powers
has never been a fixed or unalterable principle.108 The Supreme
Court has never ruled on whether the congressional veto violates
the doctrine of separation of powers. 109 The congressional veto is
quickly becoming a common feature in federal legislation.
Clearly, a decision must be made on the constitutionality of congressional vetoes across the board. In Chadha the Supreme
Court once again has the opportunity to make such a determination. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Chada and is
in a position to resolve this long-standing conflict." 0
The standard of review in Chadha could be used to attack hundreds of existing congressional veto provisions. The decision
would undoubtedly have a chilling effect on future use of the veto.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the standard of review in Chadha is flexible. It is not a per se invalidation of all legislative vetoes. For a violation to occur, one branch must assume
a central or essential power of another branch, and the assumption must infringe on the duties of the coordinate branch unnecessarily. The net effect of Chadha'sflexible standard of review is
to substantially augment the need for judicial review. Although
the long-term effect of Chadha is uncertain, the potential for a
greater judicial role is present. The role of judicial discretion inevitably increases when the courts are asked to apply such a flexible standard.
Those congressmen who oppose the removal of legislative re107. Id.

108. 1 K.C. DAVIS,

ADmmISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 2:6, at 75 (2d ed. 1978).

109. Id.

110. 634 F.2d 408, cert. granted 50 U.S!LW. 3211 (U.S. Oct 6, 1981) (80-1832).

view from suspension decisions wish to preserve the congressional mandate over the process."' The fact that the 94th and
95th Congresses reviewed only 521 cases over a four year period
and disapproved only 24112 is not impressive from a numerical
standpoint. What these congressmen fail to realize in their bureaucratic computations is that twenty-four individuals suffered
the hardship of deportation under a very questionable decisionmaking process. The impact on human lives cannot be measured
numerically. It may be wise for Congress to recall the legislative
intent of ameliorating hardship of deportation instead of focusing
on the desire to retain control over immigration matters.
CONCLUSION

Suspension of deportation has been described as an illusory
promise of relief.11 3 As far back as 1953, the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization argued that "the authorities administering the law should have sufficient discretion to
enable them to take humanitarian considerations into account."114
The Ninth Circuit decision in Chadha v. INS"15 is a positive step
toward a more rational system of suspension. The purpose behind the suspension statute is to "ameliorate hardship and injustice which otherwise would result from a strict interpretation of
the law."116 Congress is not equipped to evaluate, nor should it
have the final voice in evaluating, the humanitarian considerations necessary to equitably decide these cases. To continue to
111. Supra note 33.
112. Id. Under § 244(a) (1) Congress reviewed 508 cases and disapproved 11
while disapproving all 13 cases submitted under § 244(a) (2).
113. Comment, Suspension of Deportation: Illusory Relief, 14 SAN DmO L.
REv. 229, 256 (1976) (citing Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964)):
In construing section 244 we are in an area in which strict construction is

peculiarly inappropriate. The apparent purpose of the grant of discretion
to the Attorney General is to enable that officer to ameliorate hardship
and injustice which otherwise would result from a strict and technical application of the law. A strict and technical construction of the language in
which this grant of discretion is couched could frustrate its purpose. A
liberal construction would not open the door to suspension of deportation
in cases of doubtful merit. It would simply tend to increase the scope of
the Attorney General's review and thus his power to act in amelioration of
hardship.

Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1964).
114. PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE

SHALL WELCOME 213 (1953).
115. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
116. Wadman v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 329 F.2d 812, 816-17 (9th
Cir. 1964).
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foster Congress view of its own power at the expense of hardship
to individuals like Jagdish Chadha would be tragic.

MARK VRANJES

